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The present issue of the newsletter opens with Francisco 
Gallegos’s article “Surviving Social Disintegration: Jorge 
Portilla on the Phenomenology of Zozobra,” winner of the 
2017 APA Prize in Latin American Thought. In the article, 
Gallegos argues Jorge Portilla’s conception of zozobra, of 
the anxiety that arises when a community’s shared “horizon 
of understanding” becomes disintegrated and the basic 
norms that govern life in a society become unstable, is 
not merely psychological but existential in nature, and as 
such, it undermines our freedom at a deep, structural level, 
while giving rise to tendencies toward quietism, cynicism, 
nostalgia, and apocalyptic thinking. He further arues that 
Portilla’s analysis of zozobra sheds light on the current 
situation in the US in the wake of the extremely divisive 
2016 presidential election, and that it can help us evaluate 
various strategies for engaging in cultural politics. 
We then turn to a series of discussion articles focused on 
immigration. While immigration is now a mature topic in 
the philosophical literature, political philosophers working 
on the issue have largely ignored how immigration law is 
in fact enforced. Despite a rich and substantial literature, 
there has been little sustained discussion of detention, 
deportation, or raids, or of the significant role private 
organizations and foreign governments play in enforcing 
domestic immigration policies. What work has touched 
on these topics has tended to remain highly abstract 
and to not closely deal with existing institutions and 
practices. The result is that morally and politically salient 
issues—often the issues that immigrant communities and 
activists consider the most salient—have largely escaped 
philosophers’ scrutiny. The papers included in this issue of 
the APA Newsletter on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy
hope to remedy this to a degree, and to spark more 
philosophical interest in examining how immigration law 
actually functions in a number of different situations. 
In the first article, José Jorge Mendoza explores the serious 
problems that arise when criminal law and immigration law 
are comingled. Although it may seem to make intuitive 
sense to combine the systems, especially in an attempt 
to remove so-called “criminal aliens,” the costs of doing 
so, Mendoza shows, are high. By attaching immigration 
consequences—deportation—to criminal offenses, non-
citizens arguably face unjust double punishment if they 
commit a crime. Furthermore, the interaction between 
immigration and criminal law greatly limits the legal options 
available to non-citizens charged with crimes, as many 
plea bargains, a typical way to address a criminal charge in 
countries such as the US, would result in a removal order. 
Finally, the fact that immigration decisions are adjudicated 
in administrative law courts which lack full independence 
and many other procedural protections further highlights 
the dangers of combining immigration and criminal law. 
This mixture also makes it difficult for law enforcement to 
function well in immigrant communities because of fear 
and distrust of the police, interaction with whom may lead 
to immigration consequences. These concerns suggest 
that strong walls are needed between criminal law and 
immigration law, and that the lower level of civil rights 
protections found in immigration courts and in the way that 
immigration law is made should be revised. 
Stephanie J. Silverman examines the system of detention 
used in the UK to both discourage unauthorized migration 
and to prevent those awaiting deportation or status 
determination from absconding, and finds them wanting. 
Using detention as a means of deterrence is not empirically 
supported, Silverman argues, and also violates both liberal 
values and basic human rights principles. It is also at 
best unclear, Silverman shows, that detention is either a 
necessary or even effective means of pursuing compliance 
with immigration proceedings. Given the high moral and 
fiscal costs of immigration detention to both the state and 
to those detained, there is therefore good reason to seek 
alternatives. 
Alex Sager addresses the growing number of ways that states
have “externalized” border enforcement. States use a variety
of different methods to externalize border control, including
interdiction at sea, paying foreign governments (or those
in control of territory) to divert or detain groups seeking to
migrate, transferring would-be asylum seekers to offshore
detention facilities, and providing strong financial incentives,
in the form of potential fines, to airlines and others providing
travel, to check for visas and other transit documents. All
of these tactics, Sager argues, extend states’ power over
the lives of migrants while simultaneously making border
enforcement less visible and less accountable. The results
have been predictable—human rights abuses and failure
to live up to international treaty obligations. Moreover,
serious consideration of the externalization of border control
demands that we rethink how we conceive immigration
enforcement and consider new metaphors and models for
the regulation of human mobility. 
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Matthew Lister addresses the question of how a society 
should respond to unauthorized immigration, considering 
the question through the lens of the theory of civil 
disobedience. Using the protests and public self “outings” 
by young unauthorized immigrants brought to the US as 
children—the “Dreamers”—as a starting point, Lister asks 
what we can learn from the theory of civil disobedience 
to respond to unauthorized immigration. In at least 
some instances, he argues, this perspective provides a 
justification for applying prosecutorial discretion in favor of 
unauthorized immigrants in the short term, and for solidarity 
in seeking to change laws to support the legalization of the 
unauthorized in the longer term. We can see the protests 
led first by the Dreamers and followed later by others as 
being within the civil disobedience tradition, asking the 
larger society to recognize the injustice of their situation 
and demanding that a change—a change that those 
protesting cannot bring about on their own—be made. 
As the philosophical literature on immigration has become 
more mature, it has moved from abstract speculation 
with little close attention to or connection with actual 
immigration policies to more and more detailed and 
careful discussion of real immigration practice. This is 
a trend the contributors to this symposium support. This 
development in the philosophical literature had not yet, 
however, typically addressed the actual enforcement of 
immigration law. We hope that these contributions will 
help spark further development in this area, including work 
addressing immigration enforcement in other jurisdictions. 
SUBMISSION GUIDELINES 
The APA Newsletter on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy
is accepting contributions for the spring 2019 issue. 
Submissions are due November 15. Our readers are 
encouraged to submit original work on any topic related 
to Hispanic/Latino thought, broadly construed. We publish 
original, scholarly treatments, as well as reflections, book 
reviews, and interviews. 
Please prepare articles for anonymous review. All 
submissions should be accompanied by a short 
biographical summary of the author. Electronic submissions 
are preferred. All submissions should be limited to 5,000 
words (twenty double-spaced pages) and must follow 
the APA guidelines for gender-neutral language and the 
Chicago Manual of Style formatting. 
All articles submitted to the newsletter undergo anonymous 
review by members of the Committee on Hispanics. 
BOOK REVIEWS
Book reviews in any area of Hispanic/Latino philosophy, 
broadly construed, are welcome. Submissions should 
be accompanied by a short biographical summary of the 
author. Book reviews may be short (500 words) or long 
(1,500 words). Electronic submissions are preferred. 
DEADLINES
The deadline for spring issues is November 15. Authors 
should expect a decision by January 15. The deadline for 
fall issues is April 15. Authors should expect a decision by 
June 15. 
Please send all articles, book reviews, queries, comments, 
or suggestions electronically to the editor, 
Carlos Alberto Sánchez, at carlos.sanchez@sjsu.edu, 
or by post: Department of Philosophy 
San Jose State University 
One Washington Sq. 
San Jose, CA 95192-0096 
FORMATTING GUIDELINES
The APA Newsletters adhere to the Chicago Manual of 
Style. Use as little formatting as possible. Details like page 
numbers, headers, footers, and columns will be added 
later. Use tabs instead of multiple spaces for indenting. 
Use italics instead of underlining. Use an “em dash” (—) 
instead of a double hyphen (--). Use endnotes instead of 
footnotes. Examples of proper endnote style: John Rawls, 
A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1971), 90. See Sally Haslanger, “Gender and Race: (What) 
Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be?” Noûs 34 (2000): 
31–55. 
THE 2018 ESSAY PRIZE IN LATIN
AMERICAN THOUGHT 
The APA’s Committee on Hispanics cordially invites 
submissions for the 2018 Essay Prize in Latin American 
Thought, which is awarded to the author of the best 
unpublished, English-language, philosophical essay in Latin 
American philosophy/thought. The purpose of this prize is 
to encourage fruitful work in this area. Eligible essays must 
contain original arguments and broach philosophical topics 
clearly related to the specific experiences of Hispanic 
Americans and Latinos. The winning essay will be published 
in this newsletter. 
A cash prize accompanies the award along with the 
opportunity to present the prize-winning essay at an 
upcoming division meeting. Information regarding 
submissions can be found on the APA website. Please 
consider submitting your work and encourage colleagues or 
students to do the same. Feel free to pass this information 
along to anyone who may be interested. The deadline is 
June 5, 2018. 
The Committee is also soliciting papers or panel suggestions 
for next year’s APA three divisional meetings. The deadline 
for the Eastern APA committee session requests is rapidly 
approaching. Please send any ideas to Grant Silva (grant. 
silva@marquette.edu) who will relay these suggestions to 
the rest of the committee. 
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ARTICLES 
Surviving Social Disintegration: Jorge 
Portilla on the Phenomenology of Zozobra 
Francisco Gallegos 
WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY
In the wake of the extremely divisive 2016 presidential 
election, many US Americans are feeling deeply unsettled 
by the sense that the basic norms that govern life in our 
society are in a state of flux. Indeed, as the sociologist Arlie 
Hochschild reports, many people on both the political right 
and left are feeling like “strangers in their own land”— 
confused, disturbed, and alienated by the image of the 
country we see reflected on our screens.1 What kind of 
a nation are we? What values do we stand for? Many of 
us feel as though we no longer recognize the country we 
live in. We may feel at home in our intimate circles, but 
those who live on the other side of the political divide often 
seem completely foreign to us, and their version of the 
country feels utterly alien. In short, many of us increasingly 
struggle with the sense of being out of place in our own 
society, as though we have suddenly found ourselves in a 
foreign country whose language and customs we do not 
understand. 
How can we best describe and analyze the experience of 
living in a society so divided, a society whose very normative 
structure seems to be disintegrating? What problematic 
behaviors might arise in this situation? And how ought we 
to work for positive social change in this context? In this 
essay, I explore insights into these issues that may be found 
in Jorge Portilla’s recently translated essay, “Community, 
Greatness, and Misery in Mexican Life.”2 According to 
Portilla, when a society’s normative structure begins to 
lose its cohesion and integrity, everyday life becomes 
marked by zozobra, a profound kind of anxiety that is not 
psychological but existential in nature. Portilla argues that 
zozobra undermines our freedom for meaningful action and 
gives rise to quietism, cynicism, nostalgia, and apocalyptic 
thinking. After examining Portilla’s analysis of zozobra, 
I conclude by exploring the relevance that his work may 
have for us today. 
Portilla also lived at a time when his society’s norms were 
in a state of flux.3 In the decades following the bloody 
revolution of 1910, Mexico had engaged in a project of 
nation-building, using every means at its disposal to 
construct a unified sense of mestizo national identity 
that could bind together the various social groups in the 
country.4 This nationalist ideology represented Mexico 
as having a homogenous language, culture, and race—a 
preposterous fantasy in a country where the population 
speaks at least fifty-six different languages, not to mention 
hundreds of dialects.5 By Portilla’s time, Mexico’s project 
of nation-building was severely strained, even as intense 
forces of modernization were displacing communities and 
forcing people to migrate to cities for work.6 Thus, from 
Portilla’s vantage point in Mexico City in the 1950s and ’60s, 
the promise of a national rebirth after the revolution of 1910 
had faded, and Mexican society was gripped by a poignant 
sense that there was no shared “horizon of understanding” 
to unite this set of individuals into a genuine community. 
Portilla’s term for the experience of lacking a communal 
horizon of understanding—“zozobra”—was a word that 
was on the minds of his contemporaries as well. His fellow 
philosophers in Mexico City were alarmed by what Emilio 
Uranga described as a widespread sense of anxiety, 
uneasiness, or even anguish—a painful and peculiar sense 
of not being at home in the world—that permeated everyday 
life in Mexico.7 However, Portilla’s contemporaries tended 
to analyze zozobra in psychological terms, often describing 
“the Mexican mind” in ways that may strike today’s reader 
as being ridiculous or offensive. For example, in The 
Labyrinth of Solitude, Octavio Paz argues that the Mexican 
personality is constructed around a tragic machismo, which 
he diagnoses as being a defensive reaction to Mexico’s 
cultural mestizaje—a reaction to being part colonizer and 
part colonized, and simultaneously loving and hating 
both sides. In his view, the internal conflict produced by 
these competing attachments manifests in violence, self-
destruction, and a nihilistic worldview. In his famous essay 
“The Sons of La Malinche,” Paz writes: 
The Mexican does not want to be either an Indian 
or a Spaniard. Nor does he want to be descended 
from them. He denies them. And he does not affirm 
himself as a mixture, but rather as an abstraction: 
he is a man. He becomes the son of Nothingness. 
. . . That is why the feeling of orphanhood is the 
constant background of our political endeavors 
and our personal conflicts.8 
In a similar vein, Uranga describes the Mexican way of being 
as marked by the oscillation between conflicting extremes, 
a painful “convergence-repulsion of the ‘Christian and the 
indigenous,’ of ‘hypocrisy and cynicism,’ of ‘brutality and 
gentleness,’ of ‘fragility and toughness,’ and so on.”9 
What makes Portilla’s analysis of zozobra uniquely insightful 
is that, unlike his contemporaries, he saw zozobra not as a 
psychological state but as an existential condition—not a 
state of mind generated by conflicting attachments but a 
state of existing in a world in which there is a lack of any 
real communal horizon of understanding. Because zozobra 
is not merely psychological, it is something no amount 
of therapy could address: its source is not an individual’s 
mind or conflicting attachments but the disintegration of 
the normative structure of society itself. 
To understand Portilla’s existential-phenomenological 
account of zozobra, we must first understand his externalist 
views regarding the meaning of actions. For Portilla, the 
meaning of any action (as distinct from mere bodily 
movements or behaviors) is socially constructed. For 
example, whether your speech act constitutes a humorous 
joke or a cruel insult, whether your behavior at work is a 
sign of an industrious work ethic or contemptible servility, 
the significance of any action is determined by the socially 
instituted norms and concepts that constitute a society’s 
framework of interpretation, or what Portilla calls a “horizon 
of understanding.” For this reason, he says, whenever 
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we perform an action, we must rely on a background 
understanding of the norms and concepts that define the 
meaning of our action. We must anticipate how others will 
interpret our behavior because this social interpretation 
will determine what the meaning of our action will be. As 
Portilla puts it, 
our action . . . is not carried out in the middle of 
the desert, but in community. We cannot project 
any action whatsoever without counting on others. 
. . . Our action is inconceivable to ourselves if a 
somewhat precise halo is not attached to it, one of 
approval or reproach, of incentive or of obstacle, 
whose source is the community, those “others.”10 
Just as a writer cannot write without implicitly imagining 
a reader, every one of our actions—from the way we 
speak, to the way we dress, to the way we eat, and so on— 
involves an implicit anticipation of how others will receive 
our action.11 
When things are going well, we tend to take this interpretive 
horizon for granted. Indeed, we typically only notice its 
importance when things go wrong. When we travel to a 
foreign country, for example, we may discover that the 
norms and concepts in this place are quite different than 
those we are accustomed to and that our actions are 
interpreted in ways we did not expect. In this case, we may 
find it difficult to properly make a joke, give a compliment, 
and do things that express our character. Likewise, when 
the interpretive horizon within a community changes over 
time, a person from an older generation may find, to his 
dismay, that what once counted as a funny joke or a nice 
compliment is now interpreted as an instance of racism or 
sexual harassment. As such experiences illustrate, “These 
horizons [of understanding] have critical importance for 
human action. One of their primary functions is that of 
serving as walls against which bounce the echoes that carry 
the meaning of our actions”—a fact that becomes painfully 
obvious to us when the “echo” that bounces back “makes 
it evident that our [action] did not have the exact meaning 
that we were giving to it.”12 
In large and complex societies like Mexico, a person may 
be located within many overlapping communities at the 
same time. As Portilla puts it, 
we always live in a multiplicity of communal 
horizons that mix and weave with each other and 
that remain always potential or actual, depending 
on whether our action reveals or conceals them. 
We live always simultaneously immersed in a 
national community that can take various forms, 
from the political to the aesthetic: in a professional 
community; in a guild; in a class; in a family.13 
These various, smaller horizons of understanding, Portilla 
says, may be more or less tightly “integrated” within a 
larger horizon of understanding that binds together the 
society as a whole. In this way, Portilla imagines a spectrum 
between a “sub-integrated” society and “super-integrated” 
society. He suggests that Germany, for example, may be 
an instance of a “super-integrated” society, where the 
norms and concepts governing a person’s national identity 
are clearly defined, stable, and coherent, thus providing 
clear and substantive guidance for people as they seek 
to interpret the meaning of a given action. In this super-
integrated society, the various social roles a person may 
occupy—worker, parent, music-lover, and so on—all 
fit together in a tight, cohesive package, so that all of a 
person’s activities work together to express the national 
way of life.14 
Portilla argues that people in this kind of super-integrated 
society enjoy a certain kind of freedom, which we might 
call “agential freedom”—namely, the freedom to anticipate 
the meaning of any given action—so that they can simply 
set their minds to acting as they are willing and able to 
act. In this society, Portilla says, the “atmosphere seems to 
be a space of incredibly open opportunities for individual 
action, something like a paradise for the industrious 
man.”15 On the other hand, he argues, people in a super-
integrated society suffer from a pronounced lack of a 
different sort of freedom, which we might call “normative 
freedom”—the freedom to alter the norms and concepts 
that determine the meaning of their actions. They may do 
things that violate social norms, of course, but they do not 
enjoy the kind of freedom that comes from occupying a 
social space in which the norms and concepts that govern 
the meaning of their actions are more vague, inchoate, and 
open to innovation.16 
In Portilla’s view, Mexico is on the other side of this spectrum 
of social integration—it is a “sub-integrated” society. 
As he puts it, in Mexico “everything happens as if these 
structures of transcendence that we have named horizons 
of community suffered . . . from a lack or in-articulation.”17 
Although Mexicans are not “smothered” by rigid social 
norms (and so enjoy an abundance of normative freedom), 
in Portilla’s view, the interpretive horizons in Mexico are so
unclear and poorly defined that basic conditions for the 
possibility of meaningful action are undermined (together 
with the possibility of agential freedom). In other words, 
at a certain point, the freedom from being governed by 
social norms is not liberating at all but disorienting—and 
indeed, when normative freedom is taken to the extreme 
so that there is no stable normative horizon to resist one’s 
interpretations of the meaning of actions, it becomes 
unclear whether one’s actions can have any social meaning 
whatsoever. For this reason, Portilla describes the state 
of sub-integration as “a species of social malnutrition 
that forms a thin yet suffocating spiritual atmosphere for 
whomever must form their personality within it.”18 
Thus, on Portilla’s view, zozobra arises from the disintegration 
of a society’s horizon of understanding. This state of affairs 
is existential rather than merely psychological, and as such, 
it undermines our freedom for meaningful action at a deep, 
structural level. However, although zozobra is not primarily 
a psychological phenomenon, Portilla notes that zozobra 
tends to manifest psychologically in three distinctive ways. 
First, the experience of zozobra tends to make people 
hesitant to take action of any sort. 
In effect, if the community’s reception or response 
in regard to our action cannot be determined with 
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a certain amount of clarity, it is likely that we will 
indefinitely postpone the demanded action until 
the horizon clears up and, if this does not happen, 
we will carry it out only when the circumstances 
themselves turn it into a demand that cannot be 
postponed, and then it will probably carry within 
itself the mark of improvisation. Nothing slows 
down the impetus toward action more than 
uncertainty in regard to the manner in which the 
work to be done will be received.19 
Second, hand-in-hand with this sort of quietism comes a 
tendency toward cynicism that is also characteristic of 
zozobra. 
Thus, in a disarticulated community such as ours, 
the man of action, and even the intellectual, will 
find himself affected by a certain cynicism which 
is nothing more than a defensive maneuver 
or a movement of self-affirmation, which can 
be described with the analogy of whistling or 
humming in the dark so as to forget one’s fears. 
It is clear that a failed, unnatural, or badly interpreted 
action will turn us into introverts, melancholic and 
hopeless. Action becomes imaginary: everyday 
conversation in Mexico is filled with stories about 
men who attempted a noble act, who tried to 
realize a useful or noble endeavor, an act that 
was ultimately crushed by the harshness of the 
external world, or invalidated by collaborators who 
were inept or of bad faith.20 
Another way cynicism expresses itself, Portilla says, is 
in a tendency toward introversion, sentimentality, and 
nostalgia—a desire to escape into fantasy or into memories 
of a bygone era when life made sense.21 
Lastly, Portilla argues, the experience of zozobra manifests
itself in an apocalyptic imagination and a profound sense
of the fragility and contingency of life. In a fascinating
passage, Portilla compares what it is like to live without
a clear and stable communal horizon of understanding
to the situation of an “explorer or sailor working with a
malfunctioning compass. Her horizon, in this case a
geographical horizon, has become confusing and more
than likely threatening.”22 Likewise, he says, a person who
is attempting to navigate everyday life in a disintegrated
society must contend with an anxiety-provoking sense of
disorientation and fragility.
The individual, prevented from securely founding 
his being on the web of human relations, finds 
himself painfully exposed to the cosmic vastness. 
We live always simultaneously entrenched in a 
human world and in a natural world, and if the 
human world denies us its accommodations to 
any extent, the natural world emerges with a force 
equal to the level of insecurity that textures our 
human connections.23 
Our sense of security, in other words, is largely a 
function of our sense of community. When the horizon of 
understanding in our society is fragmented and weak, how 
can we feel capable of coping with the disasters that seem 
to be impending at every turn? 
By way of conclusion, then, I will briefly mention some ways 
that Portilla’s work might shed light on the current political 
moment in the US. First, Portilla’s analysis of zozobra can 
help us to understand our own tendencies to indulge in 
quietism, cynicism, nostalgia, and apocalyptic thinking. 
These are understandable but ultimately unhelpful reactions 
to the lack of clarity in the norms and concepts that govern 
everyday life in our own society.24 Likewise, Portilla’s work 
can help us understand one reason why people on both 
the political right and left sometimes react with outrage 
to the language and attitudes expressed by their fellow 
citizens, even when no one is directly harmed by these 
expressions. When the people in our community act in a 
way that disrupts the horizon of understanding governing 
everyday life, these disruptions in the normative order can 
constitute a genuine and profound loss of freedom for us. 
Just as when we visit a foreign country and find ourselves 
unable to act effectively in the world or freely express our 
character, when we do not understand or identify with the 
norms and concepts that govern everyday life in our own 
society, we are truly less free.25 When this happens, it is as 
though we are living in a foreign country, except there is 
nowhere to return that is more familiar and understandable; 
we are strangers in our own land. 
Portilla’s work may also help us to be a bit wiser in choosing 
our strategies for engaging in cultural politics in a society 
whose communal horizon of understanding seems to be 
disintegrating. For example, it may make us more skeptical 
of the value of satirical political comedy in this particular 
context. This comedy often expresses contempt for people 
on the other side of the political divide, and to the extent 
that such expressions of contempt further erode our shared 
horizon of understanding, they may only exacerbate our 
zozobra and ultimately undermine our freedom. Instead, 
it may be wise for those who seek to work for positive 
social change in this context to take up a strategy that 
Portilla calls “Socratic irony.” In Socratic irony, we maintain 
sincere fidelity to the mainstream values of our society, 
even while we subtly shift the expectations regarding what 
upholding these values actually requires of us—as Socrates 
did when he maintained his loyalty to the polis even while 
questioning what justice and piety requires.26 In a similar 
way, Portilla suggests, social critics within disintegrating 
societies can position themselves as giving voice to 
mainstream, non-partisan positions, even while calling for 
change in particular policies and practices. 
By choosing to articulate our concerns as expressions of 
mainstream concerns and intuitions—rather than as radical 
critiques of the mainstream launched from the margins of 
the society (as philosophers often do)—this strategy may 
promote positive change in ways that reinforces our fragile 
normative order, rather than destabilizing it. Radical critique 
is appropriate and necessary in moments of relative social 
stability. But when a society’s horizon of understanding 
disintegrates, basic democratic forces, such as communal 
deliberation about important matters, can get no grip. 
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In these ways, Portilla’s work, which reveals zozobra as an 
existential condition grounded in social disintegration, is a 
valuable resource for navigating the contemporary world. 
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DISCUSSION ARTICLES 
The Contradiction of Crimmigration 
José Jorge Mendoza 
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, LOWELL
INTRODUCTION 
On July 1, 2015, Juan Francisco López-Sánchez recklessly 
fired a handgun in San Francisco’s crowded Embarcadero 
district. The bullet ricocheted off the concrete, striking 
Kathryn “Kate” Steinle in the back and ultimately ending 
her life. If López-Sánchez were a US citizen or if this were 
his only serious lapse of judgment, this horrific incident 
might have long been forgotten. Today, however, it serves 
as a rallying point for two draconian amendments to the 
US Immigration and Nationality Act. The first takes its 
name from Steinle, Kate’s Law, and would increase the 
fines and prison time undocumented immigrants with 
criminal convictions face if they reenter the US without 
authorization. The second, entitled the No Sanctuary for 
Criminals Act, aims to inhibit the autonomy of “sanctuary 
cities,” a status indicating that the particular city does not 
allow its local public institutions (e.g., police or schools) 
to be used in the enforcement of federal immigration law. 
The No Sanctuary for Criminals Act would bar federal grants 
from going to “sanctuary cities” and allow the victims of 
crimes perpetrated by undocumented immigrants to sue 
the city if the city is a “sanctuary city.” 
So how are these two proposed amendments related to 
the fateful events of July 1, 2015? Prior to that night, López-
Sánchez already had seven prior felony convictions and 
had been deported from the US five times. López-Sánchez 
is therefore the poster child for the “criminal alien,” 
one of the “bad hombres” that Donald Trump—first as a 
presidential hopeful and now as president of the United 
States—has constantly cited as proof that the US needs 
stricter immigration enforcement. Supporters of Kate’s Law 
argue that if something like this law had been in place, 
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López-Sánchez would not have been on the Embarcadero 
that fateful night. 
Supporters of these laws also believe that if the San Francisco
Sheriff’s Department (SFSD) had simply handed over López-
Sánchez to US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
Steinle would be alive today. Instead, since San Francisco is
a “sanctuary city,” SFSD ignored ICE’s request and released
López-Sánchez after charges against him were dropped.
The aim of the No Sanctuary for Criminals Act is therefore to
pressure cities to cooperate with the federal government in
immigration enforcement matters. 
The death of Kathryn Steinle is nothing short of a tragedy, 
and one cannot help but wonder if something could or 
should have been done to prevent it. The two proposed 
pieces of legislation seem tailor-made to address such 
tragedies, and given that their primary targets are “criminal 
aliens,” it might initially seem very difficult to find the harm 
in passing such legislation. One possible response might be 
to point out that the killing of Steinle is more of an anomaly 
than a regular occurrence. By and large, immigrants commit 
far fewer crimes than citizens, and there is no evidence 
that the crime rate among immigrants, especially violent 
crime, is dramatically on the rise.1 So instead of addressing 
a threat to public safety, it turns out that these laws are 
really aimed at generating a kind of negative perception or 
fear of immigrants, which can then play a key role in future 
debates about immigration reform.2 
Still, we cannot deny that there are troubling cases like the 
death of Steinle, and regardless of whether or not these 
sorts of cases are the exception rather than the rule, many 
believe that if combining immigration enforcement with 
criminal law enforcement—a trend that has come to be 
known as “crimmigration”3—could prevent even a fraction 
of these cases from occurring, then we have an obligation 
to do so. I want to suggest in this essay, however, that 
there are other reasons, in addition to the worries about 
stoking xenophobia, for rejecting an approach like this. 
Crimmigration sets up a situation where we, in fact, get the 
worst of all worlds: where those facing criminal penalties 
are denied important constitutional protections that should 
be afforded to all persons at risk of losing life, liberty, or 
property; where those who have already been punished for 
their offenses stand to face still further penalties that in most 
other contexts would be considered cruel and unusual (i.e., 
indefinite imprisonment or exile); and where tactics aimed 
at protecting and serving local communities get usurped 
by the federal government in ways that conflict with, if not 
outright violate, the Constitution. I will therefore try to show 
that even if crimmigration could bring about some good 
consequences (e.g., saving the lives of people like Kathryn 
Steinle), there are nonetheless weightier concerns that 
need to be taken into account and that speak in favor of 
rejecting this conflation of criminal law enforcement with 
immigration law enforcement. 
DEPORTATION AND PUNISHMENT 
At the end of the nineteenth century, a series of cases 
known as the Chinese Exclusion Cases went before the 
US Supreme Court. Now infamous in the annals of US 
immigration law, these cases upheld the constitutionality 
of excluding Chinese nationals on racist grounds. The 
Chinese Exclusion Acts have since been repealed, but 
the precedent set by these cases, known as the “plenary 
power doctrine,” has yet to be overturned. This doctrine 
holds that the US federal government has almost complete 
discretionary control over matters concerning immigration. 
In other words, the federal government (and not state or 
local governments) has the ultimate say in determining 
which noncitizens may be admitted, excluded, or removed, 
and most importantly (and too often underappreciated), 
this power is largely beyond the scope of judicial review. 
What this means is that immigration courts in the US are 
not technically part of the judicial branch. They are a part 
of the Department of Justice (DOJ), which falls under 
the executive branch and is part of administrative law. 
Furthermore, decisions in immigration court are not made 
by a jury of one’s peers, but by judges appointed by the 
DOJ rather than confirmed through Congress or elected by 
the people. 
This is an enormous amount of unchecked power for any 
one branch of the federal government to have, so how has 
such a doctrine continued to pass constitutional muster, 
especially given the US’s deep commitment to individual 
liberty and a government of checks and balances? It has 
done so largely because it rests on a distinction between 
criminal offenses (e.g., murder, robbery, or assault) 
and administrative violations (e.g., overstaying a visa 
or unlawfully entering the country). This distinction was 
clarified in the 1896 Supreme Court case Wong Wing 
v. United States. At stake in the case was whether Wong 
Wing could be sentenced to sixty days of hard labor and 
subsequently deported without having received a trial by 
jury. The court ruled that there was nothing unconstitutional 
about deporting Wing without a jury trial. Deportation, after 
all, was merely an administrative matter and was not taking 
away his life, liberty, or property. The sixty-day hard labor 
provision, however, was unconstitutional because it would 
deprive Wing of his liberty without proper due process. 
So regardless of the fact that Wing was an immigrant, 
and therefore subject to removal at the discretion of the 
federal government, he was still a person and thereby 
entitled to the full range of constitutional protections if the 
government sought to take his life, liberty, or property.4 
In short, the Wong Wing decision formalized a kind of 
trade-off that makes the plenary power doctrine consistent 
with a federalized form of government built on a respect 
for individual rights and a system of checks and balances. 
In cases where the government can potentially exercise the 
maximum amount of coercion (i.e., taking away a person’s 
life, liberty, or property) individuals ought to be entitled 
to the maximum set of protections, but in cases where 
the government is not (at least not technically) coercing 
individuals, then those individuals are not necessarily 
entitled to the maximum range of protections. Also key 
here is that immigration regulation is considered to be 
exclusively within the domain of the federal government, 
so state and local governments have no right to admit (e.g., 
develop their own guest-worker program), exclude (e.g., 
keep immigrants out of their territory who have already 
been admitted into the US), or remove (e.g., create their 
own immigration enforcement taskforce) immigrants.5 In 
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other words, state and local governments are not in the 
immigration business. 
I have argued elsewhere that the plenary power doctrine 
is unjust and that a commitment to individual freedom and 
universal equality ought to entitle immigrants to a much 
wider set of rights than they currently enjoy.6 However, for 
the purposes of this essay I will assume that something like 
the plenary power doctrine is justifiable. In other words, 
that national states (not supra or subnational governments) 
have a near-absolute right to admit, exclude, and remove 
noncitizens. For constitutional democracies, exercising 
such unchecked power can be tricky, but whatever tensions 
arise from its exercise can be, as we saw in Wong Wing, 
ameliorated if the use of such power is confined to an area 
that does not violate the rights of citizens (i.e., immigration) 
and so long as the consequences are noncoercive (i.e., the 
penalties are administrative not criminal). Crimmigration, 
however, seems to upset this very delicate balance. 
CRIMMIGRATION 
According to immigration law professor César Cuauhtémoc 
García Hernández, there are three aspects that come 
together to make up the phenomenon now known as 
crimmigration: 
1.	 Criminal convictions carrying immigration 
consequences 
2.	 Violations of immigration law leading to criminal 
punishments 
3.	 Criminal law enforcement tactics being used for 
immigration enforcement7 
In this section, I would like to offer some reasons for why 
each of these aspects is morally (and, for some people, 
existentially) worrisome. I will conclude by suggesting 
that the only consistent way of dealing with the problems 
raised by crimmigration is either to maintain the strict 
separation between immigration enforcement and criminal 
law enforcement on which the plenary power doctrine is 
built, or to reject the plenary power doctrine altogether. 
Either choice, however, limits the discretion the federal 
government is normally thought to have in matters 
concerning immigration and would grant immigrants more 
rights (especially more protections from removal) than they 
currently enjoy. 
There is nothing necessarily new about the first aspect 
of crimmigration, about criminal convictions having 
immigration consequences. What is new, however, 
is the number of crimes that today carry immigration 
consequences and the vague criteria (e.g., moral turpitude) 
called upon to determine whether a crime amounts to a 
removable offense. Incentivizing immigrants to obey 
the law by threatening them with deportation might, for 
some, have a kind of intuitive appeal. This approach, 
however, raises at least three interrelated worries: Do such 
consequences not essentially punish a person twice for 
the very same offense? Do they not alter the process and 
procedure for determining a person’s guilt or innocence? 
And should they not always be off the table (i.e., be 
considered “cruel and unusual”)? The worries I raise here, 
just to be clear, have nothing to do with feeling sympathy 
for folks like López-Sánchez but have everything to do with 
a sense of fairness and a desire to avoid creating parallel 
justice systems. 
In determining matters of guilt or innocence, justice 
requires that the procedures we use to determine the 
fate of the accused be the same for everyone regardless 
of their race, sex, or even immigration status. Attaching 
immigration consequences (i.e., deportation) to criminal 
convictions puts immigrants in a very difficult position 
when trying to defend themselves in criminal proceedings. 
Immigrants cannot, for example, accept most plea bargain 
deals as such agreements would lead to their automatic 
deportation. Yet given the way the US criminal justice 
system has developed, the accused are now often strongly 
encouraged to take plea agreements—even when they 
are innocent—rather than risk taking their case to court 
where they could be hamstrung by inadequate council 
and stand to face much longer jail sentences.8 For long­
term immigrant residents, the immigration consequences 
they face (e.g., deportation) for a criminal conviction 
(which is what a plea agreement would be) are often far 
worse than the maximum sentence they could receive for 
almost any crime. Again, this is not to say that people who 
commit crimes should never suffer any repercussions for 
their actions. This is to say that regardless of a person’s 
immigration status, they should have access to the same 
system of justice—with all its kinks and nuances—and that 
punishments that are deemed too cruel and unusual for 
citizens (e.g., exile) should also be seen as too cruel and 
unusual for noncitizens. 
The second aspect of crimmigration has to do with the 
criminalization of immigration violations. A little known 
fact about the US is that before 1929 it was not actually 
a crime to enter the country without authorization. Today, 
immigration law violations and, in particular, illegal reentry 
constitute the largest category of federal offenses.9 There 
are strong reasons for thinking that immigration violations, 
much like parking violations, should rarely, if ever, be 
treated as criminal offenses. This is because they are not 
merely different in degree but different in kind. But even if 
we put these sorts of reasons aside, we should recall that 
the federal government’s power to control immigration (i.e., 
the plenary power doctrine) is based on such a distinction. 
The problem with increasingly criminalizing migration, 
as the court in Wong Wing was correct in observing, is 
that it lets the federal government have its cake and eat 
it too. It allows the federal government to take away a 
person’s liberty on a conviction obtained through its very 
own special court (DOJ), not a regular judicial court, and 
in a manner that does not extend to the accused the full 
set of constitutional protections. In short, if violations of 
immigration law are to have coercive consequence (i.e., jail 
time), then we need to radically rethink the current setup, 
which today gives the federal government virtually all the 
power and the accused (i.e., immigrants) almost none. 
Finally, there is the use of criminal law enforcement tactics 
for the purposes of immigration enforcement. There are at 
least two places where this can become very problematic. 
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The first is when civilians whose only infraction is a 
potential immigration violation are held in custody for an 
indefinite period of time without proper due process.10 The 
second is partnerships between local police and federal 
immigration enforcement. These partnerships tend to have 
bad consequences, as they sow mistrust among immigrant 
communities and police. When police function as auxiliary 
immigration enforcement agents, immigrants are less 
likely to call them when they are the victims of crime or 
come forward as witnesses to help police solve crimes. 
Also, citizens who live in mixed households are less likely 
to call or talk to police for fear that interactions with police 
might lead to the deportation of family or friends. Despite 
these consequences, there is also a deeper question 
about federalism: Can the federal government force state 
and local governments to assist in an area where it—and 
not state and local governments—has exclusive control, 
especially when this kind of cooperation could undermine 
the very aims those state and local institutions are designed 
achieve? This is the reason some cities have chosen to 
become “sanctuary cities.” They believe that the federalism 
enshrined in the US Constitution11 allows them to prioritize 
the equal protection and education of their residents over 
and above assisting the federal government in an area like 
immigration. 
CONCLUSION 
As I have tried to show in the last section, there are reasons 
to be alarmed about collapsing the distinction between 
immigration and criminal law enforcement. Notably, these 
concerns are not hypothetical but are being lived in cities 
and towns across the US today. These concerns should 
prompt us either to reject the plenary power doctrine 
entirely or to be stricter about maintaining the separation 
between criminal law and immigration law. I grant that the 
death of Steinle presents us with a very difficult case, but as 
the old adage goes, hard cases make for bad laws. In short, 
whatever good could come from laws like Kate’s Law and 
No Sanctuary for Criminals Act, it will be far outweighed by 
the potential injustices those laws will give rise to.12 
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Under the Umbrella of Administrative 
Law: Immigration Detention and the 
Challenges of Producing Just Immigration 
Law 
Stephanie J. Silverman
TRINITY COLLEGE, TORONTO
Immigration detention is the lynchpin enabling immigration 
control. Lacking a universal legal definition, detention can 
be understood as the incarceration of people who the state 
knows, or suspects, to have broken immigration rules. 
Similar in some ways to the more familiar pretrial detention 
in the criminal justice system, detention’s legitimacy 
is premised on its role as a mechanism to facilitate 
deportation. Although mostly operating out of sight, the 
common understanding of detention is that it is natural 
and unavoidable, when it is visible at all. States position 
detention to respond to, and bolster, the untrue idea that 
irregular immigration is a crime. The effect of detention 
on migrants is to feel like punishment1 and for citizens to 
shore up the idea that migrants can never be like “us.”2 
Picking up from these ideas, this contribution aims to 
unravel the British State’s “regrettable but necessary”3 
justification for detention into its key components: first, 
deterrence of future migrants, and, second, as a means to 
prevent absconding, also known as flight risk. I will argue 
that neither component of this justification is credible. The 
end result is to denaturalize and challenge the propriety of 
practicing long-term detention in a liberal community. 
I operate here within the “Conventional View” on borders, 
asylum, and immigrants. The view holds that the state 
has a moral right to adjudicate who crosses its borders 
and who gets to live permanently inside its territory.4 
One could challenge that assumption, of course, but to 
understand the phenomenon of detention and even to 
appreciate the internal tensions it generates within liberal 
democratic states like the UK, it is helpful to work within 
the Conventional View. I am also referring to detention of 
forty-eight hours or more. 
1. INCARCERATING IMMIGRANTS AND DRAWING
LINES 
Simultaneously a policy and a practice, detention has 
historically been positioned as innocuous and unavoidable. 
The state detains people in order to more efficiently realize 
other immigration-related goals, usually deportation. The 
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Conventional View suggests that, barring some exceptions, 
the state is morally justified in using violence to preserve 
citizens’ rights and privileges at the expense of those 
of noncitizens. On this view, the “usual rules” about 
incarceration and prisoners’ rights fall away: although it is 
undoubtedly confinement, detention is governed through 
a palimpsest of laws, rules, regulations, statutes, and 
emergency legislations. The peculiar nature of detention 
allows it to operate outside of, parallel to, and often 
overlapping with judicial incarceration at, within, and 
beyond the state’s borders.5 With little to no foresight or 
planning, detention grows from omission. 
As part of administrative law, there is little judicial oversight 
over detention. Its lawfulness is usually adjudicated 
through tribunals and internal review mechanisms where 
the issues are procedural not fundamental or natural 
justice, a distinction that I think is misplaced given the 
grave harms of long-term detention. In theory, international 
law curbs the harshest edges of detention and ensures 
that each detention is subject to a series of individualized 
tests with respect to the justification of that detention. 
One implication of these requirements is that it is not 
permissible under international law to detain immigrants, 
even those who have arrived without authorization, for the 
purpose of discouraging others from migrating. 
The UK typifies troubling trends across the liberal, democratic 
world in its approach to developing and implementing 
immigration policy: it defaults to detention in a context of 
enforcement-focused and militarized immigration control; 
it exhibits substantial legal and conceptual crossovers 
between criminal justice and immigration detention as well 
as between punishment and administrative convenience; 
and it typifies poor caseworking on migrant files, leading 
to people becoming “lost” or “forgotten” in the detention 
estate.6 
Immigration detention in the UK is ordered mostly at the 
discretion of individual officers, vested in power by the 
Home Office, and whose decisions are directed by statutory 
and internal guidelines. The number of people recorded as 
entering UK detention increased from 250 in 1993 to 28,900 
in 20167 with an average of 30,000 detainees annually over 
the past couple of years. Almost half are people seeking 
asylum.8 The majority of detainees are men hailing from 
former British colonies, most notably Bangladesh, India, 
Jamaica, Nigeria, and Pakistan.9 
The UK Home Office justifies detention as an appropriate 
measure when there is “a realistic prospect of removal 
within a reasonable time.”10 Surprisingly, then, two-thirds
of long-term detainees are released into the community 
and not removed from Britain.11 The consequences of the 
futility of long-term detention is redoubled by the global 
medical literature’s finding that the negative impact of 
detention on the mental health of detainees increases the 
longer detention persists.12 As Stephen Shaw concluded in 
this government-commissioned review of the UK detention 
estate, “there is too much detention; detention is not a 
particularly effective means of ensuring that those with no 
right to remain do in fact leave the UK.”13 
2. DETERRENCE PARADIGM AND LOGIC OF THE
ABSCONDING JUSTIFICATION 
The two key rationales repeated by British officials to 
justify detention are (i) that the threat of detention and 
its harms can deter people from undertaking dangerous 
migration journeys, shorthanded here to detention-as­
deterrence; and (ii) that detention, coupled with the power 
of deportation, can discourage migrants from absconding 
from the status regularization process. While both uses are, 
indeed, preventive detention for deterrence, I separate 
the (i) justification as being directed at foreigners abroad 
while the (ii) justification is for noncitizens inside the state’s 
territory. I will use my remaining space to explain why both 
justifications are related to crimmigration and neither is 
credible. 
Since the use of civil or administrative detention as 
deterrence is illegal, state officials justify detention-as­
deterrence by pointing to the riskiness of the migrant’s 
journey to the West. In response to the domination of 
European political debate and media coverage of the 
perceived “crisis” of Syrian refugees fleeing to Europe in 
2015,14 European governments implemented deterrence 
strategies. Sager, in this collection, explains how these 
governments committed valuable resources towards 
disrupting smuggling networks, preventing departures of 
migrant-carrying boats from Libya, and transferring refused 
asylum seekers amongst themselves and Turkey. 
The argument for deterring people from migrating for 
their own good is superficially appealing. The deaths of 
migrants in the Mediterranean Sea and across the land 
routes are tragic.15 There are indeed no lawful pathways to 
permanent residence for some people who arrive without 
prior authorization. However, the idea of detention-as­
deterrence fails on plausibility. There is no credible 
link between detention-as-deterrence and reduced 
immigration, nor can it filter out the criminal aliens who 
are allegedly the priority for arrest and return.16 A variation 
of the detention-as-deterrence justification runs that mass 
detention of incoming groups can net the smugglers who 
are ferrying the migrants and causing great distress to them 
and their families along the way. Research, however, calls 
this into question by showing that the agent travels near to
the border, not up to or across the border where detention 
occurs; migration flows are often “mixed” with refugees, 
economic migrants, and others coming together to travel; 
and that the “smuggler” is often a passenger assisting 
others to reach safety, including his own family members. 
A major research report suggests that “State officials, the 
military, law enforcement and border guards were also 
involved in smuggling” along the land and sea routes to 
Europe.17 A more nuanced, grounded understanding of 
“smuggling” is slowly but surely being reflected in legal 
decisions,18 thereby calling into question crimmigration’s 
representation of smugglers as criminals and undermining 
a key rationale for immigration detention. In more general 
terms, the global rise of detention has coincided with 
increased migration, and many states hosting robust 
detention systems experience large immigration flows. 
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On the topic of future migrants, any links between detention 
and deterrence are purely speculative or conjecture: it is 
virtually impossible to prove that the threat of detention 
caused someone not to migrate precisely because they 
did not migrate, and no one factor in decision-making is 
definitive due to the complexity of the push-pull dynamics of 
global migration and control. Further still, even if detention 
were demonstrated to be effective as a deterrent, it would 
still be incompatible with the principles that liberal states 
claim to respect and with international law. Liberal societies 
are not supposed to deprive people of their liberty if they 
have not committed a crime, and especially if they pose no 
threat to society if they are left free. Even in the extreme 
case of terrorists, the judicial application of principles of 
proportionality insists that preventive detention cases 
be screened for rationality and less restrictive means 
for achieving the goal.19 Moreover, as I have observed 
previously, under international law, it is not permissible 
to detain some in order to deter others. Ultimately, it is 
wrong to detain in an effort to thwart unknown people’s 
migrations and mobilities, and detention-as-deterrence is 
not credible. 
The second justification for detention is to thwart 
absconding. The underlying assumption of this argument 
is that some noncitizens will not willingly comply with the 
requirements of immigration hearings, procedures, and 
outcomes. Absconding matters to state bureaucracies 
because loss of contact disrupts deportation; it matters 
to political actors because it speaks to, amplifies, and 
provides a ready response to public anxieties about 
“foreign criminals” roaming the streets.20 For example, 
in 2014, the Ministry of Justice introduced secondary 
legislation that denies notification of lost appeals to 
refused asylum seekers, a measure taken “to prevent the 
parties absconding.”21 
Given the Conventional View’s prerogative that states are 
entitled to control immigration, it makes sense that they 
undertake to prevent or thwart absconding. The problem 
is that the thresholds of evidence to identify a potential 
absconder are low and shaky. Again, the onus of proof is 
reversed from the criminal justice context and the migrant 
must show a disinclination to abscond. Further, data on 
absconding is scarce. In 1995 the British government 
acknowledged that the absconding rate of refused asylum 
seekers was 0.59 percent; since then, the Home Office has 
remained silent, with no other credible, primary research on 
the rates of absconding in the UK being published. On the 
other hand, scholarly research finds that asylum seekers 
who have arrived in destination states like the UK “rarely 
abscond while awaiting the outcome of a visa application, 
status determination, or other lawful process.”22 Likewise, 
a global survey of programs facilitating conditional release 
from detention found that more than 90 percent of enrollees 
did not abscond. 
From a moral perspective, it is important to note that 
absconding is rarely a deliberate choice or decision; rather, 
it is often the result of bureaucratic delays or obstacles, 
and a lack of information or comprehension of duties and 
responsibilities. This is because living underground or 
clandestinely is onerous with probable risks of poverty and 
destitution. Absconders often become dependent on the 
charity of friends, strangers, and religious or community 
organizations for survival. 
Further, I argue that states like the UK provoke many of 
the minority of migrants into absconding through making 
compliance onerous if not virtually impossible. This is 
accomplished in at least three ways that snowball into 
an often-untenable situation: (i) the UK policy objective 
of rendering asylum seekers destitute, particularly 
those whose refugee claims have been refused; (ii) the 
undermining of a trust relationship between asylum seekers 
and the state, significant because trust is a necessary 
condition for a fair hearing and for guaranteeing compliance 
during the immigration and refugee status regularization 
processes; and (iii) using detention as an animating threat 
to force compliance, thereby further damaging trust and 
heightening fears of destitution. Through recognizing that 
legal, bureaucratic, and policy instruments can overlap 
into provoking some people into absconding, it is possible 
to argue that the state provokes people to abscond, but 
then points to the perceived threat of absconders as a 
justification for detention. This tautology is unreasonable 
and must be destabilized to reveal state complicity in 
prompting absconding and the overall unnaturalness and 
impropriety of practicing long-term detention in liberal 
communities. 
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Private Contractors, Foreign Troops, and 
Offshore Detention Centers: The Ethics of 
Externalizing Immigration Controls 
Alexander Sager 
PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY 
EXTERNALIZATION 
On February 3, 2017, European Union leaders met in Malta to 
discuss strategies to close the Central Mediterranean route 
from Libya. According to the International Organization for 
Migration, 181,436 migrants arrived in Italy in 2016 using the 
route. 4,576 died on the journey.1 The majority of migrants 
in 2015 came from Eritrea (25%), Nigeria (14%), Somalia 
(8%), Sudan (6%), Gambia (6%), and Syria (5%), all countries 
with significant refugee flows.2 Europe’s response was the 
Malta Declaration3 in which the EU agreed to give 200m 
euro to Libya to help prevent migrants from attempting to 
cross to Europe.4 
The decision to enlist a failed state torn between rival 
government forces and militia groups is shocking even 
to those inured to Europe’s callous refugee policy.5 The 
well-documented human rights abuses of migrants in 
Libya encompass murder, rape, forced labor, and slavery6 
and include accusations that Libya’s coast guard has 
murdered migrants. Moreover, Libya has no process that 
allows refugees to apply for asylum.7 Despite disingenuous 
remarks that the Europe only seeks to prevent smuggling, 
the Malta Declaration is a cynical attempt for Europe to 
eschew its responsibilities toward refugees.8 It is also part 
of a broader trend in which EU member states take active 
measures to prevent asylum seekers from lodging claims 
at their borders by relocating mobility controls abroad. 
Attempts to prevent migrants from arriving by outsourcing 
enforcement to foreign governments are not restricted to 
Europe. In the 1980s, the United States began intercepting 
and turning back boats from Haiti after the 1991 military 
coup, culminating in the repatriation of over 40,000 Haitians 
without giving them an opportunity to seek asylum.9 The 
US also capitalized on the sea journeys of Haitian refugees 
to pioneer offshoring asylum processing and detention in 
Guantanamo Bay.10 In recent decades, Australia has used 
offshore detention to deter immigrants and refugees from 
arriving by boat with horrific results.11 
These are all instances of the externalization of migration 
in which wealthy states seek to prevent migration and 
avoid their legal and moral obligations by moving the 
administration of migration elsewhere. Despite the 
prevalence of externalization, much work in the ethics of 
immigration assumes that the admission of immigrants 
is determined by state immigration officials who decide 
whether to admit travelers at official crossings. This 
assumption neglects how decisions about entrance have 
been increasingly relocated abroad—to international 
waters, consular offices, airports, or foreign territories— 
often with nongovernmental or private actors, as well 
as foreign governments functioning as intermediaries. 
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Mechanisms that allow for externalization include 
interceptions at sea, carried out by the state itself, a private 
contractor such as FRONTEX, or a foreign state.12 In some 
cases, such as with Australia, interception is combined with 
offshore detention either in another state or in a territory 
or in a jurisdiction defined as outside of the territory 
such as Guantanamo Bay. Visa regimes require foreign 
nationals to acquire a visa before travel, carrier sanctions 
leveled against airplane and other transport firms prevent 
people without the appropriate documents from boarding 
a plane, even if those documents are being purposefully 
withheld from them.13 Visa regimes are typically imposed 
on countries in which large numbers of people have a 
legitimate case for asylum, making it illegal for them to 
travel to countries where they might seek safety. The result 
is that much migration enforcement takes place outside 
of legal and democratic practices. Matthew Gibney vividly 
summarizes the situation: 
With only mild exaggeration one might say that a 
thousand little Guantanamos have been created 
in the last two decades: centers of power where 
states (and their formal and informal agents) 
act free from the constraints imposed on their 
activities by the courts, international and domestic 
law, human rights groups, and the public at large.14 
WHY EXTERNALIZATION IS MORALLY
PROBLEMATIC 
Externalization poses a fundamental challenge to 
achieving just migration policies. To begin, externalization 
reliably harms vulnerable people. Most obviously, the 
externalization of migration control prevents refugees from 
receiving protection. Rather than presenting themselves 
to state officials tasked to determine whether there is a 
credible case for persecution, refugees find themselves 
trapped in transit or in camps, forced to resort to smugglers 
to continue their journeys. Refugees may be returned to 
regions where they risk unjust imprisonment, torture, 
or death. By externalizing enforcement, governments 
effectively undermine the institutions necessary to grant 
people claiming asylum a right to a fair hearing. Gibney 
writes, “We have reached the reductio ad absurdum of 
the contemporary paradoxical attitude towards refugees. 
Western states now acknowledge the rights of refugees 
but simultaneously criminalize the search for asylum.”15 
Furthermore, the externalization of immigration 
enforcement leads to human rights abuses. Immigration 
enforcement is a violent business even when carried out 
inside countries with a strong commitment to bureaucratic 
professionalism and rule of law. When it is outsourced to 
countries that pay little heed to human rights or to private 
actors who face few repercussions for abuses, the result 
is predictably grim. Sadly, this result is often intended. As 
William Maley has noted in the Australian context, “The 
logic of deterrence has a devastating implication: to be 
effective as a deterrent, it is necessary that those who are 
detained suffer in the process.”16 
Harms and human rights violations are compounded by 
the ways in which externalization allows states to exercise 
power without accountability. Again, this is at least partly 
intentional: states use externalization to pass responsibility 
on to other actors and thus avoid public scrutiny. Ruben 
Andersson has noted the political usefulness of what he 
calls “illegality industry,” namely, that externalization 
“dissipates blame and accountability across a multitude of 
actors and over a large geographical area.”17 
The dissipation of blame and accountability creates 
a serious lacuna in assigning moral responsibility. It 
undermines accounts that seek to capture extraterritorial 
migration controls in terms of a principal-agent relationship 
in which states (the principal) delegate authority to other 
agents to meet their goals.18 Under this conception, states 
are morally responsible when they delegate enforcement 
to agents that do not respect human rights. For example, 
Lori A. Nessel holds that states that outsource refugee 
protection and use external border controls should be liable 
for human rights violations inflicted on migrants.19 She 
makes an analogy between the practice of extraordinary 
rendition—the outsourcing of torture—and the outsourcing 
of responsibility toward refugees to countries that do not 
or cannot respect the Refugee Convention.20 In her view, 
states that purposely outsource their responsibilities to 
these countries violate important human rights guarantees 
such as the right to nonrefoulement and the right to 
freedom from torture. 
While there are cases where it makes sense to think of 
external migration controls in terms of a principal-agent 
relationship, this underestimates the extent to which these 
controls are exercised by multiple, overlapping, sometimes 
competing organizations. Some are, in theory, accountable 
to a democratic public, others are indirectly accountable 
as state proxies, while others have no meaningful 
accountability whatsoever. This creates a democratic 
deficit and gives state and nonstate actors the power to 
interfere in the lives of migrants who have no realistic 
recourse to contest decisions and policies. Since the loci of 
responsibility and accountability are indeterminate, it is not 
clear who they would address their concerns to. 
THE PARADOX OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY FOR
POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 
How might we reconcile externalization and a just migration 
policy? One response is to forgo the externalization of 
migration policy except to actors which we can ensure are 
accountable. Though theoretically sound, this proposal 
is practically unfeasible. Externalization is very much a 
response to changes in technology and information that 
facilitate migration: it is a rational way of achieving migration 
restrictions that could not be achieved by allowing migrants 
to present their case to state authorities at official borders. 
Giving up externalization would entail that states publicly 
endorse a much more generous immigration policy to a 
skeptical public. 
Another response is to create international and/or global 
institutions to bring migration management under legal 
and democratic control. Arash Abizadeh has argued 
from democratic principles and the coercive nature 
of immigration enforcement that states should not be 
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permitted to unilaterally control their borders. He calls for 
“the formation of cosmopolitan democratic institutions 
that have jurisdiction either to determine entry policy or 
legitimately to delegate jurisdiction over entry policy to 
particular states (or other institutions).”21 Similarly, Javier 
Hidalgo provides evidence that immigration policies 
unilaterally decided by states are likely to be marred by 
predictable biases and epistemic deficits that cause or 
allow harm. He argues that to mitigate the risk of unjust 
harms, states should transfer decision-making authority to 
international institutions that would have the authority to 
regulate states’ immigration policies and would provide 
feedback and accountability mechanisms, opportunities 
for citizens of recipient states and potential migrants to 
contest policy, and impartial adjudication.22 
Would these proposals effectively address the problems 
of accountability and harm brought about by the 
externalization of migration policy? Abizadeh and Hidalgo 
frame border control as an issue of entry policy in which 
states could be instructed by a higher authority to let people 
in. Though authority is delegated to an international or 
global institution, their conception of migration regulation 
is still very much state-centered and underestimates the 
extent to which regulation is, in fact, carried out by a 
dispersed, transnational polyarchy of actors and not just 
at the border. These include multinational corporations, 
NGOs, international organizations, and substate groups. 
In the case of Libya, this includes smugglers and militias. 
Externalization blurs lines among domestic, international, 
and transnational policy and makes it difficult to distinguish 
who is regulating migration and to what ends. 
In the absence of a solution, it is worth taking a step back 
and thinking carefully about our models and metaphors. 
In particular, we need to diagnose the reasons why states 
have turned to extraterritorial enforcement. As I suggested 
above, externalization is a rational approach given certain 
views about migration. One reason for externalization is 
securitization: immigrants have been construed primarily 
as risks and threats.23 As long as fears about security 
guide state policy, externalization is a predictable strategy: 
it seeks to prevent potential threats from reaching the 
territory. 
A second reason for externalization is the conviction 
that mobility is abnormal. This conviction is part of the 
cognitive bias of sedentarism that informs much of the 
social sciences.24 If migration is abnormal, then it should be 
possible—and likely desirable—to prevent it, either through 
the use of force or by removing incentives for people to 
leave. If, in contrast, migration is seen as a normal, human 
process, then it makes more sense to ask how best it can 
be supported to maximize benefits and minimize burdens. 
A third reason for the attraction of external enforcement 
comes from the conviction that states with successful 
immigration policies must be able to prevent immigration 
(if they desire). The failure to stop immigration when 
desired is seen as a failure in policy. But regulation does 
not necessarily entail prevention. For example, successful 
transportation policy facilitates movement. Instead of 
thinking about immigration policy as selection combined 
with prevention, we should think of it in terms of facilitating 
human mobility. This will require supranational and 
transnational institutions, but they needn’t be conceived 
as to-down or primarily coercive. Nor should their goal 
be to prevent migration, but rather to work with networks 
and to correct market failures. If we can radically and 
progressively change how we think about migration and 
modify how we imagine its regulation, we can begin to see 
how externalization could be compatible with justice. 
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“Dreamers” and Others: Immigration 
Protests, Enforcement, and Civil 
Disobedience 
Matthew Lister 
DEAKING UNIVERSITY, AUSTRALIA 
In this short paper I hope to use some ideas drawn from 
the theory and practice of civil disobedience to address 
one of the most difficult questions in immigration theory, 
one rarely addressed by philosophers or other theorists 
working on the topic: How should we respond to people 
who violate immigration law?1 This paper is a work in 
non-ideal immigration theory. I will not be addressing the 
question of what an ideal or fully just immigration policy 
will be, and I will not address the question of open borders 
at all. For the sake of this paper, I will assume that states 
have some degree of authority to set immigration policies 
but also accept that these policies are all, currently, less 
than ideal and less than fully just. My question is how we 
should respond to violations of immigration law, given this 
situation. My hope is that in at least some cases, thinking 
about civil disobedience can give us some guidance here. 
I will start with what I take to be the easiest case for my 
approach—that of so-called “Dreamers”—unauthorized 
immigrants in the US who were brought to this country 
while still children (often as infants) and who have spent 
the majority of their lives in the US. Members of this group 
have engaged in wide-scale protests, making the civil 
disobedience paradigm all the more plausible. I will then 
move on to the case of unauthorized immigrants who have 
engaged in protests, but who do not fall into the “Dreamer” 
category. Finally, I will consider whether thinking about 
immigration law violations from the perspective of civil 
disobedience—and the proper response to that—can help 
us think about immigration enforcement more generally. 
DREAMERS AND IMMIGRATION PROTESTERS 
In 2011, the Dream Act, which would have provided 
legalization and a path to citizenship if desired for certain 
unauthorized immigrants in the US who had entered the 
country as children and who had lived there for a significant 
period of time, failed to pass in Congress yet again.2 In 
response to this latest failure, several “Dreamers”—would­
be beneficiaries of the failed bill—began to engage in a 
particular sort of protest, publicly “outing” themselves as 
unauthorized immigrants and daring the government to 
take action against them. These acts took place at public
rallies, at university- and school-sponsored events,3 and,
most spectacularly, in the pages of the New York Times. Jose
Antonio Vargas, a prize-winning journalist, published a story
in the New York Times about how he had been living in the
US without authorization since he was sent to the US from
the Philippines by his parents when he was twelve years old.4 
Vargas soon published other pieces, drawing considerable
attention to the case. Soon after this time, large-scale
protests, often including large numbers of unauthorized
immigrants who were not Dreamers, were staged calling for
immigration reform in the US more generally.5 
HOW SHOULD WE RESPOND TO IMMIGRATION
PROTESTS? 
Soon after the above noted events, the Obama 
administration put in place the so-called “DACA” program, a 
policy of granting “deferred action”—a type of prosecutorial 
discretion—to young, unauthorized immigrants who would 
have otherwise benefited from the Dream Act. This was seen 
by some conservatives as an end-run around Congress, 
an attempt at executive aggrandisement, and, as such, a 
possible violation of the rule of law. I want to consider both 
the protests and the response by the Obama administration 
through the lens of civil disobedience theory. 
I draw here from a classic, relatively conservative, account 
of civil disobedience provided by John Rawls.6 Rawls 
characterizes civil disobedience as a “public, nonviolent, 
conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done 
with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or 
policies of the government.”7 With only slight modifications, 
the actions of Vargas and the Dreamers who outed 
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themselves fit nicely within this paradigm. While the action 
of announcing one’s self as an unauthorized immigrant is, 
of course, not itself illegal, it is still an act done so as to 
draw attention to a contrary-to-law act. It is to announce, 
“we are here, and we are not going to leave unless we are 
forced.” This is a political act done with the intention of 
changing the law. The goal is clearly to force the population 
to see that the only way to consistently enforce the current 
immigration law is to engage in repugnant actions. This 
therefore seems like a classic case of civil disobedience. 
Was civil disobedience an appropriate tactic in this case 
(and others like it)? Rawls makes a point of saying that civil 
disobedience is only appropriate when the law at issue is 
unjust. Furthermore, the law ought not be “merely” unjust, 
or somewhat unjust, it ought to be particularly unjust, and it 
must not be possible, or at least feasible, to change the law 
in the normal way. Several features of this account are here 
relevant. While some might debate the issue, the situation 
faced by the Dreamers is one of the more plausible cases 
of clear injustice in the current US immigration system. 
Because they did not engage in any plausible wrongdoing 
in being brought to the US as children, and because it is a 
plausible wrongful harm to forcefully deprive someone of 
the context in which they have been raised and developed, 
it is not hard to find a significant injustice here. Furthermore, 
because the people involved here are noncitizens, most of 
the normal ways to try to change the law are not open to 
them. (We might here make a parallel with the de facto, 
even if not de jure disenfranchisement of African-Americans 
in the Jim Crow era, noting how this helped justify the use 
of civil disobedience to attack that system.) While most 
traditional accounts of civil disobedience assume that it is 
addressed by one citizen to another, and we, formally, lack 
that here, we can see these actions as saying, in part, that 
people who ought to have the chance to be citizens are 
being prevented from having the opportunity. 
If the above account is correct, what does it tell us about 
how to respond to these protests? The right thing to do 
here would be to change the law to grant, on generous 
terms, access to full membership to this group. We have, 
unfortunately, failed to do this. The law hasn’t changed. 
Now, officials typically have a duty to enforce laws against 
all that they apply to. So should we be rounding up and 
deporting the Dreamers who have outed themselves, 
thereby making it unnecessary for the officials to find 
them? This path has been followed, to a degree, by the 
Trump administration, with growing fear, even before the 
proposed ending of DACA, that it will become the norm.8 
However, even if the law cannot be changed, the uniform 
enforcement of it may not be required by the rule of law. 
As Rawls notes, it can be reasonable to suspend punishment 
or the enforcement of the law in the face of civil disobedience. 
The fact that it seems inhumane to punish these people 
helps to show that our sense of justice has been invoked, 
and because of this, prosecutorial discretion is plausible. 
Prosecutorial discretion is not without problems. It may be 
used in an ad hoc way that allows unjust laws to be used 
against minorities or unpopular groups, while shielding 
majorities or favored groups from harm. (This is arguably 
the case with the application of many drug laws in the 
US.) So prosecutorial discretion needs some justification 
before it is applied. Often this could be because the law 
is uncertain and there are reasonable disagreements as 
to what it requires, or because enforcing the law would 
require people to act against their conscience, as well 
as the banal reason that we must often direct limited 
resources to the most important cases. At most, only the 
last of these reasons clearly applies here. But we might also 
think that punishment, or other harsh treatment such as 
deportation, is appropriate only if it will do some good that 
outweighs the harm done to the people the law is applied 
to. I claim here that this burden can be met, sometimes 
easily, in many cases of immigration law, though it seems 
especially plausible in the case of the Dreamers, making 
prosecutorial discretion especially plausible here until a 
more satisfactory, permanent, solution can be reached. 
This conclusion supports the appropriateness of the DACA 
program and suggests that it should remain in place until a 
permanent change to the law is made. 
A more difficult case arises when we consider the now-
stalled attempts by the Obama administration to extend 
the protections of the DACA program to other groups of 
unauthorized immigrants, in particular to people who had 
entered as adults, but who have US citizen or permanent 
resident family members. One possible difficulty can be 
dealt with quickly. While fewer members of this wider 
group have been involved in protests that are clearly 
understandable as appeals to our public conscience than 
have Dreamers, this need not be any more of a problem 
than was the fact that only a minority of African-Americans 
were involved in actual civil rights protests. In both cases, 
those actively involved in protests can stand in for the 
wider group. 
A more difficult issue arises in that this group is less clearly 
subjected to an injustice, at least if we do not assume all 
immigration laws are unjust. Unlike the Dreamers, those in 
this group came to the US (or remained there) in violation 
of immigration laws as adults, and so could normally be 
seen as properly held responsible for this action. This 
might make us wonder if the civil disobedience paradigm 
is the right one here. However, when we consider another 
aspect of Rawls’s account, a way forward appears. Rawls 
held that one of the roles of civil disobedience is to signal 
that fair terms of cooperation have been violated. This 
claim is particular relevant in this case. We may start by 
noting that, while the people at issue here have made 
contributions to society—it’s doubtful that large parts of the 
US economy would function well without their labor; they 
pay a significant amount of taxes, often without receiving 
benefits; and they break the law at a rate significantly 
below average—they have been excluded from many of the 
benefits and advantages of full membership. Furthermore, 
if there was no demand for their presence on our part, then 
there would be many fewer of the people in this class here 
now. (Recent trends in the unauthorized population in the 
US suggest this, both the declining overall numbers, and 
the difficulties faced by agricultural employers and others 
in light of fear caused by increased enforcement by the 
Trump administration.9) 
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I argue that it is at least plausible that, in a situation like that 
which the US has faced for quite some time—where there 
is a strong demand for immigrant labor that is not met and 
can’t be met through legal means—that it is unreasonable 
to treat those who do meet the demand as if they were 
garbage or worn-out machines to be thrown away when they 
become less useful. Some might argue that deportation is 
reasonable because, whether their labor was needed or 
not, the people in question did violate immigration laws. 
But if, following Rawls, we think that the mere existence 
of an institution doesn’t give rise to obligations unless the 
institution is reasonably just, this claim would be too quick. 
And if we think that it may be reasonable to violate the law 
when fair terms of cooperation are not followed, this may 
indicate that it is unreasonable to enforce immigration laws 
here, at least in respect to some unauthorized migrants, 
and at least until we can come to a more just situation. 
Importantly, this follows from the logic behind civil 
disobedience, even if we do not reject the rights states may 
have to enforce immigration laws altogether. Lack of space 
prevents me from being able to try to fully determine which 
unauthorized immigrants the above argument should apply 
to, but it is at least a significant group. 
One final argument must be considered before closing. 
While civil disobedience often inconveniences the larger 
population, it is harder to justify when it involves significant 
wrongdoing itself, or where it is done to seek protection 
from significant wrongdoing. So we must ask if those 
who violate immigration laws have engaged in seriously 
blameworthy acts. Popular rhetoric often suggests this 
with the use of terms like “line-jumpers.” However, there is 
reason to think that many cases of unauthorized immigration 
are not seriously blameworthy. First, for many unauthorized 
immigrants, there is no line which they are jumping. They 
are not eligible for immigrant (or often temporary labor) 
visas, and so are not, in any plausible way, “cutting ahead” 
of anyone else. Secondly, the fact that people enter without 
inspection does not prevent people who are eligible for 
visas from entering and gaining what they have some right 
to. Therefore, they are not plausibly denying anyone else of 
anything they have a right to. I do not claim that this shows 
that all enforcement of immigration law is wrong. But these 
facts ought to make us slow to condemn violators and more 
willing to treat them humanely and as people who are merely 
seeking better opportunities and a more just society. When 
we see this, as looking at these issues through the lens 
of civil disobedience theories suggests we should, then 
we can see that even in the case of “typical” immigration 
violators, we have good reason to not treat them as if they 
were criminals or willful noncooperators. This does not 
mean that we must stop all immigration enforcement until 
we have a just world order. Doing so might well prevent the 
creation of a just world order. But it does at least suggest 
that we need, even in this case, humane and reasonable 
enforcement policies, not the militarized ones that treat 
immigration violators as criminals that are found in the 
US and in many other wealthy countries, and may further 
show the need to struggle to improve immigration laws in 
wealthy countries. 
NOTES 
1.	 An exception to this claim is found in the work of Javier 
Hidalgo. See, in particular, “Resistance to Unjust Immigration 
Restrictions,” Journal of Political Philosophy 23, no. 4 (2015): 
450–70; and “The Duty to Disobey Immigration Laws,” Moral 
Philosophy and Politics 3, no. 2 (2016). Hidalgo would extend 
a right to resist immigration laws considerably beyond that 
discussed in this paper, to a degree that seems unwarranted and 
incompatible with general principles of liberal democracy, but 
which fit better with his own libertarian views. I cannot further 
pursue the differences between our views here. 
2.	 Various versions of the Dream Act had been submitted for 
several years only to be rejected by Republicans in Congress. 
This particular version of the Dream Act included requirements 
that the beneficiaries have no significant criminal record, and 
that they achieve certain educational standards or enrol in the 
military. 
3.	 I started significantly thinking about this topic when a University 
of Pennsylvania undergraduate publicly “outed” herself as an 
unauthorized immigrant at a Penn student event on immigration 
reform where I was a panel member. 
4.	 See Jose Antonio Vargas, “My Life as an Undocumented 
Immigrant,” New York Times Magazine, June 22, 2011. 
5.	 The threat of ending the DACA program by the Trump 
administration has revitalized immigration protests around the 
dreamers. I return briefly to these developments below. 
6.	 I draw on this account not necessarily because I think it is the best 
available, but because it is well established and “conservative” in 
the sense of requiring fewer controversial premises than some 
other accounts of civil disobedience. 
7.	 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 364. 
8.	 See, e.g., Rory Carroll, “Deportation of ‘Dreamer’ to Mexico 
appears to be first under Trump,” The Guardian, April 18, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/apr/18/trump-first­
deportation-dreamer-daca-mexico; Adam Clark, “ICE Summons 
Rutgers ‘Dreamer,’ Stirring Fear of Deportation,” NJ.com, 
May 1, 2017, http://www.nj.com/education/2017/05/rutgers_ 
student_ice_meeting_deportation_fears.html. The second story 
is perhaps especially relevant, as it suggests Dreamers may be 
targeted for their protest actions. 
9.	 See, e.g., Jens Manuel, Krogstad, Jeffrey S. Passel, and D’vera 
Cohn, “5 Facts about Illegal Immigration in the US,” PewResearch. 
org, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/27/5-facts­
about-illegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/. 
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